In its end-of-mission press release, Elie Canetti, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) team that conducted an Article IV consultation on T&T earlier this month, said that this country was “not in a crisis” because of its “substantial financial buffers” and its “low, albeit rising levels of public debt.” The financial buffers refer to the savings—both the foreign reserves and the monies in the Heritage and Stabilisation Fund (HSF)—that the country has built up over the years.
Canetti added that despite the financial buffers and the country’s low, but rising public debt levels, “the country has under-saved and under-invested in its future,” in recent years, “taking into account the size of energy revenue windfalls.”
On this point, Canetti concluded: “As a consequence, the imbalances that are now starting to build up could lead the country to uncomfortable levels of debt and external financial cushions absent further action.”
Several questions arise from the judgment formed by the IMF mission chief on the performance of the T&T economy:
A. Crisis or downturn?
Canetti’s conclusion is based on the fact that T&T had an HSF balance of US$5.77 billion at the end of June 2015 and foreign reserves of US$9.531 billion at the end of February 2016, which were down from US$11.316 billion at the start of 2015.
Countries are considered to be in financial crisis if they have exhausted their savings and, more particularly, if they are unable to access loans at non-usurious interest rates from the international capital market to settle their domestic and international financial commitments as they become due.
Jamaica has been in crisis for much of its post-Independence history, which is why that country has been forced to endure 15 loan programmes with the IMF since its independence in 1962, borrowing funds for 16 of the 30 years between 1984 and 2014, according to a Reuters report in October, 2014.
T&T was in crisis at the end of 1986, when the administration of George Chambers was defeated by a landslide by the coalition led by the late ANR Robinson. In December 1986, T&T had run down its foreign reserves and was unable to access US-dollar loans from international lenders to settle the principal and interest payments on its loans, which were due, or were coming due.
Former Finance Minister, Wendell Mottley, in his book Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Policy 1959 to 2008 estimates that the total capital expenditure by this country between 1974 and 1983 in developing the infrastructure and funding the methanol, ammonia and iron and steel plants at Point Lisas was US$3.3 billion, a significant percentage of which would have been borrowed.
T&T was forced to enter into loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank in 1987 to 1989 period because no international bank would lend the country the money to repay the Point Lisas loans, which were “bunched” in that period.
So, in an attempt to diversify the economy away from its dependence on oil, the T&T State adopted the role of entrepreneur (a chapter in Mottley’s book) and undertook a massive programme of expenditure, partly funded by debt, to build the Point Lisas Industrial Estate and wholly owned ammonia, urea, methanol and iron and steel plants (what was then called ISCOTT) as well as the highway, electricity supply and the port at Point Lisas.
That expenditure and that debt led the country into a crisis at the end of 1986, when commodity prices collapsed and the interest rates on its loans increased.
If policymakers of today do not, or cannot, learn from the mistakes of the past, then this country is doomed to repeat the 1986 experience.
Models of development
In my view, the main lesson from 1986 is the issue of ownership.
In its post-Independence history, T&T has adopted several models of development:
1. The State as entrepreneur: As outlined above, this meant the State borrowing the money and making the equity investments in 100-per cent-owned companies or in joint ventures with foreign partners. This meant that the State—which is simply a proxy the taxpayers—was taking the risk of providing the equity and borrowing large sums of money to develop infrastructure and plants;
2. Foreign multinationals as entrepreneur: Large multinationals like ArcelorMittal, Methanex, the Potash Corporation, BP, Shell/BG, BHP and others invested in buying or building plants in T&T. These companies are driven by the profit motive and the risk and rewards of ownership accrue to mostly foreign shareholders, based in London, New York or Luxembourg.
3. State as nanny: The Marxists and Trotskyites among us advocate a model of state ownership of the commanding heights of the economy (Point Lisas and Point Fortin), not driven by the profit motive of returning value to shareholders, but by a social motive, in which the role of trade unions takes primacy and workers receive double-digit wage increases, with only lip service being paid to productivity.
4. Ownership by locals: My model, as stated on numerous occasions in this space, is of local ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, driven by the profit motive with dividends and profits accruing to local institutions and individuals and workers encouraged to buy shares in companies so that they share the risks and rewards of ownership.
In my view, for T&T to develop in the post-energy future, its individuals and institutions need to take on the responsibilities and risks of owning much more of the plantation than we currently do. This is not excluding foreigners or the State (on behalf of the population) from ownership, but simply to ensure that T&T individuals and institutions are the main owners.
And ownership needs to extend to beyond T&T:
• upstream: owning the source material (which would mean owning an iron ore mine in the case of ArcelorMittal);
• midstream: which would be owning the plant and the value-adding companies and products;
• downstream: local ownership of the ships that transport the product; the insurance, the financing as well as the marketing of the production and the marketing of the final product and the market intelligence.
Owning the plantation is necessary but not sufficient, as there is money to be made all along the value chain and that money ought to accrue to T&T individuals and institutions.
The closest that we as a nation have come to this model of local ownership is in Lawrence Duprey’s ownership of the methanol complex at Point Lisas.
Duprey was an example of mobilising the T&T’s savings to invest in the T&T’s natural gas. The mobilisation of T&T’s savings as the start-up capital for the diversification of the T&T economy is absolutely necessary.
Duprey’s problem was that he placed the risk of ownership on mainly unsuspecting policyholders and not on eyes-wide-open shareholders.
It is obviously better if the risks and rewards of ownership accrue to willing shareholders rather than unwilling policyholders or an inefficient, nepotistic and inevitably corrupt State.
The perfect example of dysfunction in T&T today is that we still export most of our high-quality cocoa (raw material) to Europe and Japan, where sugar is added to it and it is sold back to us at exorbitant prices.
T&T needs to ask itself: why, in 2016, do we still export our cocoa and import chocolates?
The answer, of course, is that our exchange rate is grossly overvalued, which subsidises imports and penalises exports.
To achieve this model, we need to diminish the profits our corporate sector makes from importing, marking up and selling to the local market and, at the same time, increase the profits from exports through adding-value to local products and by owning the value chain.
B. Have we under-invested in our future?
From my perusal of the 2015 Review of the Economy document, T&T collected $100 billion in energy taxes and royalties in the six years between the 2010 and 2015 fiscal years (for the period October 2009 to September 2015.)
T&T collected $15.733 billion in taxes and royalties on the energy sector in the 2010 fiscal year, $18.437 billion in the 2011 fiscal year, $18.274 billion in the 2012 fiscal year, $17.150 billion in the 2013 fiscal year, $19.368 billion in the 2014 fiscal year and $11.677 billion in the 2015 fiscal year.
If the argument is that too much of that $100 billion was spent on transfers and subsidies, that is certainly correct (see Table above).
By my calculation, T&T spent $172.8 billion on transfers and subsidies in the six-year period under review, which would have been more than half of the country’s total expenditure, according to the 2015 Review of the Economy.
But, in reviewing T&T’s expenditure on transfers and subsidies with a view to decreasing it, it must be remembered that money spent on transfers and subsidies improves the lives of the population. Less money transferred to the population will mean a lower standard of living for a significant percentage of the population.